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Abstract—Bitcoin-NG is among the first blockchain proto-
cols to approach the near-optimal throughput by decoupling
blockchain operation into two planes: leader election and trans-
action serialization. Its decoupling idea has inspired a new gen-
eration of high-performance blockchain protocols. However, the
existing incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has several limitations.
First, the impact of network capacity is ignored. Second, an
integrated incentive analysis that jointly considers both key
blocks and microblocks is still missing.
In this paper, we aim to address the two limitations. First, we
propose a new incentive analysis that takes the network capacity
into account, showing that Bitcoin-NG can achieve better incentive
compatibility against the microblock mining attack under limited
network capacity. Second, we leverage a Markov decision process
(MDP) to jointly analyze the incentive of both key blocks and
microblocks, showing that Bitcoin-NG is as secure as Bitcoin
when the adversary controls less than 35% of the computation
power. We hope that our in-depth incentive analysis for Bitcoin-
NG can shed some light on the mechanism design and incentive
analysis of next-generation blockchain protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin—the largest and most influential cryptocurrency—
has sparked many other cryptocurrencies, gaining much atten-
tion from both academia and industry [1]. The key innovation
behind Bitcoin is the Nakamoto Consensus (NC), which is
used to realize a distributed ledger known as the blockchain.
Due to its unique features of decentralization, security, and
privacy, blockchain technology has been envisioned as a funda-
mental trust infrastructure for supporting future decentralized
Internet applications.
However, Bitcoin and other NC-based blockchains have
suffered from the low transaction throughput (e.g., 7 TPS1
in Bitcoin) and the poor network utilization (e.g., less than
2% in Bitcoin [2]). The low throughput of Bitcoin is mostly
due to its choice of two system parameters: small block size
(originally 1 MB) and long block interval (on average 10
minutes). Although increasing the block size or shortening
the block interval can increase the throughput, the resulting
severer forks would incredibly reduce the advantage of honest
participants against the adversaries, thereby sacrificing its
security level [3]–[5]. Indeed, it has been shown in various
studies [5]–[7] that redesigning the underlying NC (rather than
fine-tuning the system parameters) is essential to improve the
throughput.
Bitcoin-NG (Next Generation) [7] is among the first and the
most prominent NC-based blockchains to approach the near-
optimal throughput. Bitcoin-NG creatively leverages two types
1TPS is short for transactions per second.
of blocks: 1) a key block that is very similar to a conventional
block in Bitcoin except that it doesn’t carry any transactions,
and 2) a microblock that carries a set of outstanding transac-
tions. Any key block is generated through the leader election
process (often known as the mining process) in NC, and the
corresponding leader will receive a block reward (if the key
block ends up in the longest chain). In addition, this leader
can issue multiple microblocks and receive the transaction fees
until the next key block is generated. Unlike Bitcoin, Bitcoin-
NG decouples leader election and transaction serialization.
Intuitively, it is this decoupling that enables Bitcoin-NG to
approach the near-optimal throughput, since the microblocks
can be produced at a rate up to the network capacity. Perhaps
for this reason, Bitcoin-NG has been adopted by two major
cryptocurrencies: Waves2 and Aeternity3.
More importantly, this decoupling idea has inspired a new
generation of blockchain protocols including ByzCoin [8],
Hybrid consensus [9], Solida [10], Prism [11], and many
others. These protocols are able to achieve lower latency
and/or higher throughput than Bitcoin-NG. Nevertheless, their
reward mechanism design and formal incentive analysis are
less well known in the literature. Indeed, even the existing
incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has several limitations, as
we will explain shortly. As a starting point to bridge this
research gap, we aim to provide an in-depth incentive analysis
for Bitcoin-NG, hoping that it would shed some light on the
mechanism design and incentive analysis of aforementioned
next-generation blockchain protocols.
The prior works of Bitcoin-NG found that Bitcoin-NG
cannot maintain the incentive compatibility of microblocks
when an adversary controlling larger than about 29% of the
total computation power [7], [12]. In addition, an adversary
with the same computation power can gain higher reward
proportion in Bitcoin-NG than in Bitcoin by launching key-
block and microblock attack [13]. Despite these important
findings, previous incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has the
following limitations. First, the impact of network capacity is
ignored in the previous analysis [7], [12], [13]. Do the above
findings still hold under network capacity constraints? Second,
an integrated incentive analysis that jointly considers both key
blocks and microblocks is still missing. Do the above findings
still hold in such a scenario?
To answer the first question, we develop a new probabilistic
2Waves: https://docs.wavesplatform.com/
3Aeternity: https://aeternity.com/
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analysis that takes network capacity into account. In particular,
we introduce two random variables: 1) the interval between
two consecutive key blocks and 2) the generation rate of
microblocks to capture the impact of network capacity with
incentive analysis. Then, we apply the Chernoff-type bounding
techniques to derive the long-term average revenue of the ad-
versary. We find that by choosing suitable system parameters,
Bitcoin-NG can remain incentive compatibility even when the
adversary has more than 29% of the computation power.
To address the second question, we leverage an MDP model
to jointly analyze the incentive of key blocks and microblocks.
Although similar analysis has been conducted by Sapirshtein
et al. [14] in the context of Bitcoin4, the microblock structure
introduces additional complexity for the MDP design (e.g.,
more mining strategies and rewards). To make the MDP
tractable, we confine our analysis to a family of joint mining
strategies. Our results show that the optimal selfish mining
threshold of Bitcoin-NG is just a little lower than Bitcoin when
the selfish computation power is greater than 35%.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a new incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG
considering the network capacity. The results show that
Bitcoin-NG can achieve even better incentive compatibil-
ity against the microblock mining attack.
• We model the selfish mining of key blocks and mi-
croblocks jointly into an MDP. The results show that the
threshold of Bitcoin-NG is a little lower than in Bitcoin
only when the selfish mining power α is greater than
35%.
• We discuss the instability and possible security attacks
caused by high-fee transactions. We also design a pre-
proposing mechanism to resist the leader corruption at-
tack. Our solutions can be easily adopted in other Bitcoin-
NG variants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some necessary backgrounds for our work. Section III
introduces the system model and the Bitcoin-NG microblock
selfish mining strategies. The mathematical analysis of the
Bitcoin-NG incentive is given in Section IV in the more
formal model. Section V presents the MDP of selfish mining in
Bitcoin-NG. Section VI discusses how to improve the security
of Bitcoin-NG. Related work is discussed in Section VII.
Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Primer on Bitcoin
Bitcoin relies on Nakamoto Consensus (NC) to make a
group of distributed and mutually distrusting participants reach
agreement on a transparent and immutable ledger, also known
as the blockchain. A blockchain is a list of blocks linked
by hash values with each block containing some ordered
transactions. To make all participants agree on the same
4Due to the similarity, the MDP can be directly used to model the key-block
mining in Bitcoin-NG.
blockchain, NC leverages two components: the Proof-of-Work
(PoW) mechanism and the longest chain rule (LCR). Each
participant in NC (also referred to as a miner) collects valid
and unconfirmed transactions from the network, orders, and
packs these transactions into a block. In addition, a valid block
needs to contain a proof of work, i.e., its owner needs to find a
value of the nonce (i.e., a changeable data filed) such that the
hash value of the new block has required leading zeros [1]. The
length of leading zeros is also known as the mining difficulty,
which can be tuned by the system so that new blocks are
mined every ten minutes on average.
B1 B2
B3
B4 The longestchain rule
Fig. 1. An illustration of the chain structure in Bitcoin.
Once a new block is produced, it will be broadcast to the
entire network. Ideally, the block should be accepted by all
participants before the next block is produced. In reality, two
new blocks could be mined around the same time, leading to
a fork in which two “child” blocks share a common “parent”
block. See Fig. 1 for an illustration. To resolve the blockchain
forks, an honest miner always accepts the longest chain as the
valid one. In Bitcoin, any block that is eventually included in
the longest chain will offer its miner a block reward, and the
associated transactions also have some fees for the miner as
another type of reward. These incentives encourage rational
miners to devote their computational resources to the system.
Selfish Mining. Although NC is designed to fairly reward
miners according to their contributions to the system (i.e.,
miners’ revenue is proportional to their devoted computation
power), the studies in [14]–[17] show that a selfish miner can
gain more revenue than its fair share by deviating from the
protocol. This mining attack is called selfish mining. In this
attack, a selfish miner can keep its newly discovered blocks
secret, mine on top of its blocks, and leverage its lead to
create forks on purpose. When some honest miners mine a
new block, the selfish miners will publish one secret block
to match the current block as a competition, or publish two
blocks to override an honest block because honest miners
follow LCR. By invalidating honest blocks and lowering the
valid computation power, a selfish miner can obtain a higher
block reward fraction than it deserves. Sapirshtein et al. [14]
converted selfish mining strategies of Bitcoin into an MDP
and concluded that the optimal computation power threshold
making selfish mining profitable is 23.21%.
B. A Primer on Bitcoin-NG
In Bitcoin, the mining of blocks has two functionalities: 1)
electing leaders (i.e., the owners of valid blocks) by NC, and
2) ordering and verifying transactions. By differentiating block
2
functionalities, Bitcoin-NG decouples the leader election with
the transaction serialization. Specifically, Bitcoin-NG uses key
blocks mined by proof-of-work to elect a leader at some stable
rate (i.e., one key block per 100 seconds). Each leader can pro-
duce several microblocks containing outstanding transactions
at another rate (i.e., tens of seconds). Clearly, the decoupling
method enables Bitcoin-NG to process many microblocks
between two consecutive key blocks and significantly increases
the Bitcoin-NG transaction throughput. Fig. 2 illustrates the
two types of blocks. Note that microblocks do not contain
proof of work.
Bj σ1j σ2j Bj+1
σ3j σ
4
j
σ1j+1 σ
2
j+1
Fig. 2. An illustration of Bitcoin-NG. A square block (circle block) denotes
the key block (microblock, respectively). The microblocks are issued by the
two key-block miners Bj ,Bj+1 with their signatures σj , σj+1, respectively.
Once a key block or microblock is produced, it will be
broadcast to the network. Due to network delay, there may
exist blockchain forks. In Bitcoin-NG, microblocks carry no
weight, not even a secondary index for miners to choose which
key block to mine. For instance, if an honest miner observes
two chains, one with 3 key blocks and 6 microblocks and the
other with 4 key blocks and 3 microblocks, the miner will still
choose the chain with 4 key blocks. In other words, an honest
miner still follows LCR to choose a “right” key block (i.e., the
last key block in the longest chain counting by key blocks),
and then mine on the latest microblock produced by the
key-block miner. Thus, without microblocks, the Bitcoin-NG
mining process of key blocks is the same as the one in Bitcoin.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Mining Model
Following the mining models [7], [15], [18], we consider a
collection of n miners, denoted by the set N . We assume a
subset of miners S ⊂ N are selfish and can deviate from the
protocol to maximize their own profit. The other miners in N\
S are honest and follow the protocol. The i-th miner has mi
fraction of the total hash power. In addition, the selfish miners
(honest miners) control α (β, respectively) fraction of total
mining power. That is, α =
∑
i∈S mi and β =
∑
i∈N\S mi.
Clearly, α+β = 1. We assume that all the selfish miners form
a mining pool controlled by a single player, which is referred
to as the selfish miner.
The mining process of the key block can be modeled as a
Poisson process with rate f , as shown in [1], [11], [19] 5. The
key block mining process of the ith miner is also a Poisson
5The key block is mined by solving the PoW puzzle, and the value of f can
be calculated by the average block interval, which is 10 minutes per block in
Bitcoin and 100 seconds per block in Bitcoin-NG.
process with the rate mif . Hence, the selfish miner generates
a key block at the rate αf and the remained honest miners
generate a key block at the rate βf . In addition, the miner
of each key block becomes a leader and can issue a series of
microblocks containing as many outstanding transactions as
possible (up to the maximum microblock size) at a constant
rate v until the next key block is mined. Specifically, block
(including key block and microblock) mined by an honest
miner (or the selfish miner) is referred to as honest block (or
selfish block), respectively.
B. Network Model
Following the network model of Bitcoin [15], [18], we
assume that honest miners are fully connected through the
underlying network, and an honest miner spends negligible
time to broadcast a key block or microblock in Bitcoin-NG6.
In addition, we assume that the selfish miner can broadcast
its private blocks immediately after it sees a new honest key
block.
C. Mining Rewards
In Bitcoin-NG, there are two types of rewards, namely key-
block reward and transaction fee. Every miner obtains a key-
block reward if it mines a key block by successfully solving
a PoW puzzle. In addition, each transaction has a fee (i.e.,
transaction fee) as a reward to incentive a key-block miner to
verify and execute this transaction. This fee also encourages
the miner to include the transaction in a microblock. Limited
by the microblock size, the number of included transactions
in one microblock is constant. So the maximum transaction
fee for each microblock is also constant7.
We use Kb and Kt to denote the key-block reward and
the maximum transaction fee included in one microblock. Let
k = Kb/Kt denote the ratio of block reward with the transac-
tion fee. This ratio k ranges from (0,∞). When k approaches
0 (∞), it implies that the transaction fee (key-block reward,
respectively) dominates the reward. The different values of
k exhibit the various impact of rewards on the Bitcoin-NG
system.
D. Mining Strategies
In this section, we introduce the mining strategies for honest
and selfish miners. In particular, we focus on mining strategies
for microblocks, since strategies for key blocks have been
extensively studied [14]–[16]. In Bitcoin-NG, an honest key-
block miner includes outstanding transactions in microblocks
and publishes these microblocks to win transaction fees. This
is called the transaction inclusion rule. In addition, an honest
miner should accept as many microblocks issued by the
previous key-block miner as possible and mine on the latest
received microblock, i.e., obeying the longest chain extension
6This assumption is reasonable for key blocks because the inter-arrival time
of two consecutive key blocks is often much larger than the block propagation
delay. On the other hand, this assumption can be relaxed for microblocks, as
we will show later.
7The microblock size is set to several KB for high efficiency, and in reality,
the majority of the transactions carries small transaction fee.
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rule. By contrast, a selfish miner could break the transaction
inclusion and the longest chain extension rules to maximize
its profit as explained below:
• Transaction inclusion attack. When the selfish miner
publishes one or more key blocks, it withholds the last
several microblocks created after the last key block. That
is to say, the selfish miner continues to mine on top of
its microblock chain, while honest miners mine on the
last published selfish key block. Fig. 3 shows the case in
which the selfish miner withholds all microblocks mined
after the key block Bj .
Bj
σj σj · · · σj Bj+1
Bj+1
Fig. 3. An example of the transaction inclusion attack. A red (blue) square
block is a selfish (honest, respectively) key block.
• Longest chain extension attack. When the selfish miner
adopts an honest key block, it can reject some (or
all) microblocks and mine directly on the last accepted
microblock block (or the last key block, respectively).
In other words, the selfish miner rejects the transactions
in these microblocks issued by the previous honest key-
block miner. This attack is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Bj
σj σj · · · σj Bj+1
Bj+1
Fig. 4. An example of the longest chain extension attack. A red (blue) square
block is a selfish (honest, respectively) key block.
E. Mining Revenue
The selfish miner is incentivized to find an optimal selfish
mining strategy to increase its revenue. Specifically, the utility
of the selfish miner can be presented by relative revenue [14],
[15], i.e., the ratio of the selfish miner’s revenue (including
key-block reward and transaction fees) to all miners’ revenue.
In other words, the selfish miner would like to increase its
share of key-block reward and transaction fees generated by
the system8, which is given by
u = lim
t→∞
ra(t) + ta(t)
ra(t) + rh(t) + ta(t) + th(t)
, (1)
where ra(t), rh(t), ta(t), and th(t) are the key-block rewards
and transaction fees won by selfish miners and honest miners
during time [0, t], respectively.
8The number of key block and outstanding transactions to be included into
the longest chain is regarded as constant.
IV. INCENTIVE ANALYSIS FOR MICROBLOCK
In this section, we analyze the incentive of microblock
mining. We will present both the prior analysis [7], [12] and
our new analysis.
A. Original Analysis
To resist the transaction inclusion attack and the longest
chain extension attack, Bitcoin-NG divides the transaction fees
included in microblocks between two consecutive key blocks
into two parts. The first key-block miner gets the r fraction
(r ∈ [0, 1]), while the second one obtains the remaining 1− r
fraction. Fig. 5 illustrates the distribution rule. The remaining
subsection shows how to decide the value of r to resist the
microblock mining attacks.
Bj σj σj · · · σj Bj+1
r 1− r
The miner of the key block Bj produces
microblocks utilizing its signature σj .
transaction fees
Fig. 5. Bitcoin-NG transaction fees distribution [7]
1) Resisting Transaction Inclusion Attack: When an honest
key-block miner includes transactions into a microblock, it
will publish the microblock and share the transaction fees
with the subsequent key-block miner. However, the selfish key-
block miner can create a microblock with these transactions
and withhold this microblock to win all the transaction fees.
Specifically, the selfish miner tries to mine a new key block on
top of this secret microblock, while other honest miners mine
on top of an older microblock. If the selfish miner succeeds
in mining the subsequent key block, it obtains 100% of the
transaction fees. Otherwise, some honest miners mine the next
key block and place these transactions in their new microblock.
Then, the selfish miner continues to mine on the microblock
to win the remaining 1− r transaction fees. To guarantee the
average revenue of the selfish miner launching the above attack
is smaller than he deserves, the distribution ratio should be
win 100%︷ ︸︸ ︷
α× 100% +
Lose 100%, but mine after txn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)× α× (100%− r) < r,
therefore r > 1− 1−α1+α−α2 . This ratio requirement encourages
the selfish miner to place a transaction in a public microblock.
Later, Yin et al. [12] found that the above condition can be
made even tighter by including an extra term α(1− r) on the
right hand side (which considers the possibility that the selfish
miner is elected as the next leader):
win 100%︷ ︸︸ ︷
α× 100% +
Lose 100%, but mine after txn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)× α× (100%− r) < r + α(1− r),
therefore r > α1−α .
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2) Resisting Longest Chain Extension Attack: To increase
revenue from some transactions, the selfish miner can ignore
these transactions in honest microblock and mine on a previous
block. If the selfish miner mines a key block, it can place these
transactions in its own microblock. To resist this attack, the
selfish miner’s revenue in this case must be smaller than the
revenue obtained by obeying the longest chain extension rule.
Therefore, we have
Mine next key block︷ ︸︸ ︷
α× r +
Mine the third key Block︷ ︸︸ ︷
α2 × (100%− r) <
Mine on microblock︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(100%− r) ,
which leads to r < 1−α2−α . Taking the upper bound into con-
sideration, the distribution ratio r is 1− 1−α1+α−α2 < r < 1−α2−α .
When α is less than 25%, we obtain 37% < r < 43%. Hence,
r = 40% is chosen in the Bitcoin-NG [7].
The analysis well fits the selfish mining of high-fee trans-
actions, which are usually too few to consider the network
capacity. In other words, the selfish key-block miner can create
enough microblocks to contain these transactions despite the
microblock size and generation rate. However, for the majority
of low-fee transactions, the analysis is not accurate anymore.
Let us revisit the example of the longest chain extension attack
in Fig. 4. Honest key-block miners can include as many as pos-
sible transactions (up to microblock size) into its microblocks.
Assume that the selfish miner rejects all the microblocks and
the associated transactions, and then tries to include these
transactions into its own microblocks after finding a key block.
It is easy to see that these transactions will exhaust the capacity
of the selfish miner microblocks. The selfish miner would lose
the chance to win new transaction fees. In other words, without
considering the impact of microblock capacity, the analysis
magnifies the selfish miner revenue for the majority of low-
fee transactions.
Remark 1. The analysis does not consider the impact of key-
block selfish mining. Specifically, when α is less than the selfish
mining threshold (i.e., 23.21% introduced later), the optimal
mining strategy of key blocks is honest mining, i.e., miners
publish their newly mined key block immediately and mine
on others’ new key block. Thus, the key-block reward fraction
of each miner equals its computation power proportion. Our
later analysis in this section also follows the same setting
when α < 23.21%. However, once α is above the key-block
selfish mining threshold, the selfish miner has the chance to
launch the key-block mining attack to make more profit, and
the impact of the key-block selfish mining cannot be ignored.
We will study the selfish mining of both microblock and key
block when α ∈ [0, 0.45) in Sec. V.
B. New Analysis
In this section, we follow the mining model in Sec. III-A and
consider the revenue for the selfish miner and honest miners
during a time interval [0, t]. Without loss of generality, we
assume there exists a block B0 that the selfish miner and
honest miners both agree to mine on at the starting time. (For
example, B can be the genesis block.) The following lemma
bounds the number of key blocks mined during the interval
[0, t].
Lemma 1. During the interval [0, t], the number of key blocks
mined M has the following Chernoff-type bound: For 0 < δ <
1,
Pr(|M − ft| > δft) < e−Ω(δ2ft). (2)
Proof. Recall from Sec.III-A that the key block generation
process is a Poisson process with rate f . Thus, during the
interval [0, t], the expectation of the total number of mined key
blocks is ft, and M is a Poisson random variable with rate
ft. By Lemma 5, we have Pr(M > (1 + δ)ft) < e−Ω(δ
2ft)
and Pr(M < (1 − δ)ft) < e−Ω(δ2ft), which completes the
proof.
This lemma shows that as t increases, the number of key
blocks M is between (1 + δ)ft and (1 − δ)ft with high
probability. Now, let m ∈ [(1− δ)ft, (1 + δ)ft] be an integer
and let Xi (i ∈ [0,m]) denote an indicator random variable
which equals one if the i-th key block is a selfish key block,
as described below
Xi =
{
1, selfish key block
0, honest key block.
Without loss of generality, we assume block B0 is an honest
key block. For other key blocks, the possibility that a key block
is a selfish key block equals the selfish miner computation
power α.
After mining a key block, its owner can issue a series of
microblocks at a constant rate v until the next key block
is mined. Let Yi denote the interval between the i-th key
block and (i+ 1)-th key block. Thus, the number of produced
microblocks between i-th and (i + 1)-th key blocks is vYi.
In addition, each microblock contains a fixed number of
transactions and a maximum total transaction fee Kt (see
Sec. III-C). For simplicity, the microblocks produced between
the 0-th and 1-th key block and/or after the m-th key block,
and the corresponding transaction fees are ignored. In other
words, we only consider the associated rewards with key block
Bi (i ∈ [1,m − 1]). Based on this model, the remaining
subsections will re- the suitable value of r to resist the two
microblock attacks.
1) Resisting Transaction Inclusion Attack: Recall the attack
from Sec. III-D that the selfish miner hides some of its
microblocks generated after a key block but keeps mining on
top of the microblock chain. Hence, honest miners directly
mine on top of the selfish miner’s last published block. Let ρ
denote the fraction of the unpublished microblocks among all
the selfish microblocks between two consecutive key blocks9.
Clearly, if ρ = 1, there are no microblocks between two
consecutive key blocks separately mined by the selfish miner
and honest miner. Thus, if any two consecutive key blocks
satisfy (Xi, Xi+1) = (1, 0) , there are (1−ρ)vYi microblocks
9In reality, the selfish miner cannot foresee how many microblocks it can
produce until the next key block is mined, but it can set a number for the
published microblocks according to its history data.
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between them from the view of an honest miner; otherwise,
there are vYi microblocks.
Let Zi denote an indicator random variable equal to one if
{Xi = 1, Xi+1 = 0}, and equal to zero otherwise. Next, let
Z =
∑m−1
i=1 Zi. The following lemma will aid us to bound
the value of Z with high probability:
Lemma 2. For m consecutive key blocks, the number of block
pairs (Xi, Xi+1) = (1, 0) has the following Chernoff-type
bound: For 0 < δ < 1,
Pr(|Z − αβ(m− 1)| > δαβ(m− 1)) < e−Ω(δ2αβm). (3)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume the value of
m is odd. Let Zj =
∑(m−3)/2
k=0 Zj+2k+1 where j ∈
{0, 1}. Then, Z = Z0 + Z1. Our key observation is that
{Z1, Z3, . . . , Zm−2} are independent random variables, be-
cause Zi is a function of (Xi, Xi+1). Particularly, E
(
Zj
)
=
E
(∑(m−3)/2
k=0 Zj+2k+1
)
=
∑(m−3)/2
k=0 E (Zj+2k+1). Note
that P{Zi = 1} = P{Xi = 1}P{Xi+1 = 0} = αβ, since
Xi and Xi+1 are independent. Thus, we have E
(
Zj
)
=
αβ(m− 1)/2. By Lemma ??, we have
Pr (Z < (1− δ)αβ(m− 1)) < e−Ω(δ2αβ(m−1)) = e−Ω(δ2αβm).
Similarly, we can prove that Pr (Z > (1 + δ)αβ(m− 1)) <
e−Ω(δ
2αβm).
This lemma shows as m increase, the number of key pairs
(Xi, Xi+1) = (1, 0) is between (1− δ)αβm and (1 + δ)αβm
with high probability. In addition, as the value of m increases,
with high probability the total amount of transaction fees is
close to
m−1∑
i=1
(vYiRt − ρvZiYiRt) = vRt
m−1∑
i=1
(1− ρZi)Yi
= vRt(1− αβρ)(m− 1)/f.
(4)
In other words, due to the transaction inclusion attack, the
vRtαβρ(m − 1)/f transaction fees would be lost for all
miners. Clearly, the selfish miner loses rvRtαβρ(m − 1)/f
transaction fees when an honest key block is found after its
last published block. Thus, the transaction fees won by the
selfish miner is vRt(α− rαβρ)(m− 1)/f .
The Lemma 1 shows as interval t increase, the number of
mined key blocks M also increases and is close to ft with
high probability. Thus, combined with Lemma 2, it’s easy
to see as interval t increases, with high probability, the total
amount of transaction fees is close to vRt(1−αβρ)(ft−1)/f ,
while the transaction fees won by the selfish miner is close
to vRt(α− rαβρ)(ft− 1)/f . Thus, with high probability the
selfish miner’s relative revenue of transaction fees during [0, t]
is close to
u′ = max
0≤ρ≤1
vRt(1− αβρ)(ft− 1)/f
vRt(α− rαβρ)(ft− 1)/f
= r + max
0≤ρ≤1
α− r
1− αβρ.
(5)
Clearly, if r ≤ α and ρ = 1,
u′ = r +
α− r
1− αβ ;
otherwise, ρ = 0 and u′ = α. To guarantee the adversary
cannot gain more from the transaction inclusion attack, the
relative revenues of the selfish miner in the above two cases
can not be greater than α. By solving the equations, we have
r > α.
2) Resisting Longest Chain Extension Attack: Recall the
attack from Sec. III-D that the selfish miner can bypass some
honest microblocks, and mines directly on an old honest
block. Similarly, let ρ denote the rejected microblock fraction.
If ρ = 1, this means the selfish miner rejects all honest
microblocks and mines directly on the last honest key block.
Thus, if two consecutive key blocks are (Xi, Xi+1) = (0, 1),
there are (1 − ρ)vYi honest microblocks accepted by the
longest chain. Let Ki denote an indicator random variable
equal to one if {Xi = 0, Xi+1 = 1}, and equal to zero
otherwise. Let K =
∑m−1
i=1 Ki. The following lemma will
aid us to bound the expectation of K for m blocks:
Lemma 3. For the m block sequence, the number of block-
pair (Xi, Xi+1) = (0, 1) has the following Chernoff-type
bound: For 0 < δ < 1,
Pr(|K − αβ(m− 1)| > δαβ(m− 1)) < e−Ω(δ2αβm). (6)
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 2. We omit it here due
to the space constraint.
This lemma 2 shows as m increase, the number of key pairs
(Xi, Xi+1) = (0, 1) is between (1− δ)αβm and (1 + δ)αβm
with high probability. In addition, as the value of m increases,
with high probability the total amount of transaction fees is
close to
m−1∑
i=1
(vYiRt −KiρvYiRt) = vRt
m−1∑
i=1
(1− ρKi)Yi
= vRt(1− αβρ)(m− 1)/f.
(7)
Due to the longest chain extension attack, the vRtαβρ(m −
1)/f transaction fee would be lost for all miners. Clearly, the
selfish miner loses (1− r)vRtαβρ(m− 1)/f transaction fee
for rejecting vαβρ(m − 1)/f honest microblocks. Similarly,
as interval t increases, with high probability, the total amount
of transaction fees is close to vRtαβρ(ft − 1)/f , while the
transaction fees won by the selfish miner is close to vRt(α−
(1−r)αβρ)(ft−1)/f . Thus, with high probability the selfish
miner’s relative revenue of transaction fees during [0, t] is close
to
u′ = max
0≤ρ≤1
vRt(α− (1− r)αβρ)(ft− 1)/f
vRt(1− αβρ)(ft− 1)/f
= 1− r + max
0≤ρ≤1
r − β
1− αβρ.
(8)
Clearly, if r ≥ β, ρ = 1 and
u′ = 1− r + β − r
1− αβ ;
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otherwise, ρ = 0 and u′ = α. To guarantee the adversary
cannot gain more from the transaction inclusion attack, the
relative revenues of the selfish miner in the above two cases
can not be greater than α. By solving the equations, we
have r < β. Combining the two incentive sub-mechanisms
of transaction inclusion and longest chain extension, the value
of r needs to satisfy that
α < r < β.
Remark 2. Our analysis assumes that the number of mi-
croblocks is vYi between the ith key block and the (i+1)th
key block. It can be extended to the case that the number of
microblocks is a function of Yi. This function can be used to
take into account some practical factors, such as the network
delay.
C. Comparison
We now compare our bounds of split ratio r with the results
in prior work [7], [12]. The split ratio r in Bitcoin-NG [7] is
1 − 1−α1+α−α2 < r < 1−α2−α (see Sec. IV-A). The bound of r
is tighten to be α1−α < r <
1−α
2−α under the same model by
Yin et al. [12]. Compared with these results, the range of r in
our model is pretty wide and quite different as α < r < β,
depicted in Fig. 6. It’s easy to see when the α is more than
29%, the intersection of the two conditions [7], [12] is empty.
That implies the incentive compatibility of Bitcoin-NG cannot
be maintained anymore. By contrast, as α is less than 50%10,
our analysis shows there always exists a valid value for r to
maintain the incentive compatibility of Bitcoin-NG.
Fig. 6. The comparison of the transaction fee distribution ratio.
Bitcoin is shown to resist more than 29% selfish computa-
tion power in prior works [7], [15], [20]. Specifically, under
the optimal network assumptions (i.e., zero block latency
network), Bitcoin is secure against almost 1/3 selfish mining
power [7], [15]. In addition, the work [20] shows Bitcoin is
secure under 32% selfish computation power by optimizing
the protocol. For these cases, the analyses [7], [12] show that
Bitcoin-NG is less resilient than Bitcoin because there is no
valid value for r. By contrast, our analysis shows that security
can be guaranteed by adopting a suitable value of r.
10This is because once α is above the 1/2, the selfish miner can launch
the well-known 51% attack and gains more.
The transaction model and analysis [7], [12] well fit the
high-fee transactions, which account for a minority of all trans-
actions. Thus, miners compete to include them in microblocks
and do not need to worry about the microblocks’ capacity
limit. Once included, there are no more high-fee transactions
for the consecutive leaders. However, in reality, the majority
of transactions have small transaction fees, and the volume
of outstanding transactions is usually larger, such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum [21]. Thus, our model is more realistic in
such a scenario where outstanding transactions are more than
what the network can process. More importantly, the high
transaction fees usually cause instability of the whole system
(see Sec. VI-B). For safety, a blockchain system should limit
the maximum value of the fee that a transaction can include.
V. INCENTIVE ANALYSIS FOR BOTH MICROBLOCK AND
KEY BLOCK
In this section, we first model the selfish mining strategies
of both key blocks and microblocks with a Markov decision
process (MDP) and then use the MDP to compute the optimal
revenues of the selfish miner with different computation power.
The results enable us to have a more complete picture of the
security of Bitcoin-NG since our previous analysis focuses on
α < 23.21%.
A. Designing a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
The MDP of the selfish mining process in Bitcoin-NG is
based on the previous work [14] in which Sapirshtein et al.
transformed the selfish mining strategies in Bitcoin into an
MDP. Unlike Bitcoin, the microblock architecture in Bitcoin-
NG introduces two new attacks, i.e., the transaction inclusion
attack and the longest chain extension attack (see Sec. III-D).
Thus, merging these two microblock attacks into the selfish
mining of key blocks is a key step in our new analysis.
However, it is non-trivial to realize this. On one hand,
the additional microblocks introduce extra complexity for
the MDP design (e.g., more mining strategies and rewards);
on the other hand, the number of microblocks between two
consecutive key blocks varies, which relies not only on the
key block interval, but also on the selfish miners’ mining
strategies. So, we introduce two simplifications here based on
our analysis in Sec. IV. First, the key block interval is set
to a constant 1/f , and the number of microblocks produced
between two consecutive key blocks is v/f . Second, only
the binary choices (i.e., publishing or hiding all selfish mi-
croblocks in the transaction inclusion attack, and accepting or
rejecting all honest microblocks in the longest chain extension
attack) are considered.
An MDP can be presented by a 4-tuple M := (S,A, P,R),
where S is the state space, A is the action space, P is the
stochastic state transition matrix, and R is the reward matrix.
Specifically, S contains all possible states in the selfish mining
process; A includes the available actions (e.g., publishing or
hiding blocks by the selfish miner) at each state; P contains
the transition probabilities from the current state to the next
state according to the taken action; R records how much the
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selfish miner obtains when there are some state transitions.
Table I illustrates the MDP of selfish mining in Bitcoin-NG.
Below we will discuss each component of the 4-tuple:
Actions. The selfish miner has eight actions in our model.
• Adopt and include. The selfish miner accepts all honest
key blocks and the corresponding honest microblocks. In
other words, the selfish miner will mine its key block on
the last honest block and abandon its own private chain.
This action is referred to as adopt.
• Adopt and exclude. The selfish miner accepts all hon-
est key blocks and microblocks except for microblocks
produced after the last honest key block. Specifically, the
selfish miner directly mines on top of the last honest key
block, which is referred to as adoptE.
• Override and publish. The selfish miner publishes all
its key blocks and corresponding microblocks whenever
its private chain is longer than the honest one. The chain
length is counted by the key block. This action is denoted
as override.
• Override and hide. The selfish miner publishes all its
key blocks and the microblocks except for these mined
after the last selfish key block whenever its private chain
is longer than the honest one. This action is denoted as
overrideH.
• Match and publish. When an honest miner finds one
new key block, the selfish miner publishes its key block
of the same height and the microblocks built after this key
block. This action is available when the selfish miner has
one block in advance and is referred to as match.
• Match and hide. When an honest miner generates a new
key block, the selfish miner publishes its key block of the
same height while hides the microblocks built after this
key block. This action is also available when the selfish
miner has one block in advance. This action is denoted
as matchH.
• Wait. In this action, the selfish miner does not publish any
new key blocks and microblocks, while keeps mining on
its private chain until a new key block and corresponding
microblocks are found.
• Revert. The selfish miner reverts its previous actions.
Specifically, the selfish miner can publish its hidden
microblocks when there is no honest key block mined
after its block; the selfish miner can include the honest
microblocks (decided to excluded in the previous de-
cision) or excludes the honest microblocks (decided to
included in the previous decision) once there is no selfish
key block mined on honest block.
State space. The state space S is also composed by 4-tuple
(la, lh, fork, lastMicroBlock).
• la accounts for the length of the chain mined by the
selfish miner after the last common ancestor key block.
Note that the length is counted by the selfish key blocks
in this branch.
• lh is the length of the public chain which can be viewed
by all honest miners.
• fork. The field fork obtains three possible values, dubbed
noTie, tie and tie′. Specifically, tie means the selfish
miner publishes lh selfish key block and the correspond-
ing microblocks; tie′ presents the selfish miner publishes
lh selfish key block and the corresponding microblocks
except for these after the last selfish key block; noTie
signifies that there are not two public branches with the
equivalent length.
• lastMicroBlock. This field also includes four possible
values, dubbed Hin, Hex, Sp, and Sh. Specifically, Hin
(Hex) represents the common ancestor is an honest key
block, and the corresponding microblocks are accepted
(rejected, respectively) by the selfish miner. While Sp (or
Sh) which stands for the common ancestor is a selfish
key block, and the corresponding microblocks mined are
published (or hidden) by the selfish miner.
State Transition and Reward. We use a 4-tuple (Rh, Th, Ra,
Ta) to indicate the rewards won by the selfish and honest
miners in the state transitions. Specifically, Rh (Ra) is the
key block rewards for honest miners (the selfish miner, re-
spectively), while Th (Ta) is the transaction fee for honest
miners (the selfish miner, respectively). In addition, instead
of recording the number of rewards, each field only records
the number of key block reward or transaction fees (the
total transaction fee in v/f microblocks as one unit) won
by miners. More importantly, the transaction fees included in
the microblocks after the common ancestor key block are not
assigned to miners until the next ancestor key block is decided.
This is because these transaction fees are affected by some
future actions of the selfish miner (see Sec. IV).
In adopt or adoptE actions, the selfish miner accepts lh
honest key blocks and the microblocks mined before these
key blocks. Honest miners obtain lhKb key block rewards
and (lh − 1)v/fKt transaction fees. In override or overrideH
actions, the selfish miner publishes lh + 1 selfish key blocks.
Honest miners accept these key blocks and the microblocks
produced before the key blocks. Thus, the selfish miner obtains
(lh + 1)Rb key block rewards and lhv/fRt transaction fees.
In the match actions, the next state depends on whether
the next key block is created by the selfish miner (w.p. α),
by some honest miners working on the honest branch (w.p.
(1 − γ)(1 − α)), or by the left honest miners mining on the
selfish branch (w.p. γ(1 − α)). In the latter case, the selfish
miner effectively overrides the honest miners’ branch. It can
obtain lhKb key block reward and (lh − 1)v/fKt transaction
fees. Note that the value of γ is decided by the adopted fork
solution (e.g., γ = 0.5 in the uniform tie-break policy).
Once the common ancestor key block changed, the trans-
action fees in the microblocks produced after the previous
ancestor key block will be assigned. There are two cases.
• The previous common ancestor key block is mined by
an honest miner. This case can be further divided into
two subcases: 1) the next key block is mined by honest
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TABLE I
STATE TRANSITION AND REWARD MATRICES FOR THE OPTIMAL SELFISH MINING.
State × Action State Probability Reward Condition
(la, lh, ·, Sh), adopt (1, 0, noTie, Hin)
(0, 1, noTie, Hin)
α
1− α
(lh, lh, 0, 0)
−(la, lh, ·, Sp), adopt (lh, lh − 1 + (1− r), 0, r)
(la, lh, ·, {Hin, Hex}), adopt (lh, lh − 1, 0, 0)
(la, lh, ·, Sh), adoptE (1, 0, noTie, Hex)
(0, 1, noTie, Hex)
α
1− α
(lh, lh, 0, 0)
−(la, lh, ·, Sp), adoptE (lh, lh − 1 + (1− r), 0, r)
(la, lh, ·, {Hin, Hex}), adoptE (lh, lh − 1, 0, 0)
(la, lh, ·, Hex), override (la − lh, 0, noTie, Sp)
(la − lh − 1, 1, noTie, Sp)
α
1− α
(0, 0, lh + 1, lh + 1)
la > lh(la, lh, ·, Hin), override (0, r, lh + 1, lh + (1− r))
(la, lh, ·, {Sp, Sh}), override (0, 0, lh + 1, lh)
(la, lh, ·, Hex), overrideH (la − lh, 0, noTie, Sh)
(la − lh − 1, 1, noTie, Sh)
α
1− α
(0, 0, lh + 1, lh + 1)
la > lh(la, lh, ·, Hin), overrideH (0, r, lh + 1, lh + (1− r))
(la, lh, ·, {Sp, Sh}), overrideH (0, 0, lh + 1, lh)
(la, lh, noTie, ·), wait (la + 1, lh, noTie, ∗) α (0, 0, 0, 0) −(la, lh + 1, noTie, ∗) 1− α
(la, lh, noT ie,Hin), match
(la, lh, tie, Hin), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie, Hin) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sp) γ(1− α) (0, r, lh, lh − 1 + (1− r))
(la, lh + 1, noTie, Hin) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, noT ie,Hex), match
(la, lh, tie, Hex), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie, Hex) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sp) γ(1− α) (0, 0, lh, lh − 1)
(la, lh + 1, noTie, Hex) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, noTie, {Sp, Sh}), match
(la, lh, tie, {Sp, Sh}), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie, ∗) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sp) γ(1− α) (0, 0, lh, lh)
(la, lh + 1, noTie, ∗) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, noTie, Hin), matchH
(la, lh, tie
′, Hin), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie
′, Hin) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sh) γ(1− α) (0, r, lh, lh − 1 + (1− r))
(la, lh + 1, noTie, Hin) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, noT ie,Hex), matchH
(la, lh, tie
′, Hex), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie
′, Hex) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sh) γ(1− α) (0, 0, lh, lh − 1)
(la, lh + 1, noTie, Hex) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, noT ie, {Sp, Sh}), matchH
(la, lh, tie
′, {Sp, Sh}), wait
(la + 1, lh, tie
′, ∗) α (0, 0, 0, 0)
la ≥ lh(la − lh, 1, noTie, Sh) γ(1− α) (0, 0, lh, lh)
(la, lh + 1, noTie, ∗) (1− γ)(1− α) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(la, lh, tie
′, ·), revert (la, lh, tie, ∗) 1 (0, 0, 0, 0) −
(la, lh, ·, Sh), revert (la, lh, ∗, Sp) 1 (0, 0, 0, 0) lh = 0
(la, lh, ·, Hex), revert (la, lh, ∗, Hin) 1 (0, 0, 0, 0) la = 0
∗ denotes the state element remains the same in the state transition.
miners, and honest miners get v/fkt transaction fees;
2) the next key block is mined by the selfish miner
and lastMicroBlock = Hin, honest miners get rv/fkt
transaction fees and the selfish miner gets (1− r)v/fkt
transaction fees.
• The previous common ancestor key block is mined by the
selfish miner. This case can be further divided into two
subcases: 1) the next key block is mined by the selfish
miner, and the selfish miner gets v/fkt transaction fees;
2) the next key block is mined by some honest miners
and lastMicroBlock = Sp, the selfish miner gets rv/fkt
transaction fees and honest miners get (1 − r)v/fkt
transaction fees.
B. Evaluation Results
We use the MDP toolbox developed in MATLAB [22] to
obtain the selfish miner’s relative revenue, denoted in the
equation (1). Note that in the following evaluations, Bitcoin-
NG adopts the uniform tie-breaking policy (γ = 0.5).
The selfish mining threshold. Fig. 7 shows the relative
revenues of the selfish miner when r = 0.4 (used in Bitcoin-
NG [7]) and α ∈ [0, 0.45]. We consider three reward settings:
k → 0, k = v/f , and k →∞. Specifically, in the first setting,
the transaction fees dominate the miners’ revenue; in second
setting, the transaction fees included in v/f microblocks
between two consecutive key blocks have the same weight
with one key block reward; in the third setting, the key block
rewards dominate miners’ revenue. Note that the key block
reward dominated case has a similar reward distribution as
Bitcoin, i.e., the microblock architecture does not impact the
system.
The selfish mining thresholds in these three settings are
all 23.21%, which illustrates that when adopting the suitable
r, the microblock architecture does not affect the system
security compared with Bitcoin. In addition, the selfish miner’s
revenues in the three settings are still the same even when
α > 29%, which also supports that Bitcoin-NG is as resilient
as Bitcoin.
When α > 35%, the differences between the selfish miner’s
revenues in the three settings and the honest revenue are
clearly exhibited in Fig. 8. It’s easy to see that the selfish miner
can obtain the highest revenue in the transaction fee dominated
case. This implies that the microblock architecture can slightly
increase the selfish miner’s revenue, but the increase is much
smaller than the results [13]. We delay explaining the reason.
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Fig. 7. The selfish miner’s relative revenue.
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Fig. 8. The relative revenue when α ∈ {0.35, 0.4, 0.45}.
The selfish revenue with different split ratio. Fig. 9 shows
the selfish miner’s relative revenue with different values of r
and different values of α. In Fig. 9, we only consider the case
of k → 0 (the transaction fee dominated case). We can see
when r ranges from 0.2321 to 0.7679, the selfish revenue is
the lowest.
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Fig. 9. The selfish miner’s relative revenue with different computation power
α and split ratio r.
C. Comparison
First, we validate that when adopting the suitable r, the
selfish mining threshold in Bitcoin-NG is the same as the
threshold in Bitcoin [14]. This shows Bitcoin-NG and Bitcoin
have the same security level. Our result first supports the
security claim of Bitcoin-NG [7] by using MDP.
Second, we find out that when α > 35%, the selfish miner
in Bitcoin-NG can gain more revenue than in Bitcoin. But
the increase is not so significant as shown in the previous
result [13]. This is because Wang et al. [13] treated the selfish
mining of key block and microblocks as two independent
issues and take the outputs of key-block mining attack (i.e., the
fraction of selfish key blocks) as input into microblock mining
analysis. That method will amplify the selfish miner’s revenue
by serializing the key block and microblocks mining. By
contrast, our MDP integrates the selfish mining of key blocks
and microblocks together, which makes it more accurate and
convincing.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Leader Corrupted Attack
In Bitcoin-NG, when a miner generates and publishes a key
block, it will become a leader and can produce a series of
microblocks. However, once publishing its key block, this new
leader is likely to be corrupted (e.g., by bribery), and then it
can manipulate the transactions in the following microblocks.
To address this issue, we design a pre-proposing mechanism
by using the Merkle tree as shown in Fig. 10. First, each
miner pre-proposes a set of microblocks, and each microblock
contains several outstanding transactions. Next, the miner
constructs the hash of these microblocks into a Merkle tree
and includes the root in its key block header. Finally, the miner
starts solving the PoW puzzle of this key block.
Key Block
TimeStamp
Merkle Root
PoW Nonce
PoW Target
Coinbase TX
Root
H01
H1 H2
H34
H3 H4
Fig. 10. The new key block structure.
When a key block is mined, the key block header together
with the hash values of the pre-proposed microblocks will be
published by the leader. Later on, these microblocks will be
published whose hash values, as well as the pre-determined
order (i.e., their positions in the Merkle tree) should match
the Merkle root. Other miners can easily verify these mi-
croblocks. Once they find out a mismatch, they can reject these
microblocks. Clearly, this mechanism prevents a key block
leader manipulates the transactions in its issued microblocks
after bribery. In some sense, this mechanism is another way of
decoupling leader election and transaction serialization, which
we believe is the spirit of Bitcoin-NG.
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B. Transaction Fee Limits
A Bitcoin or Bitcoin-NG client can create and broadcast
a transaction with an arbitrary transaction fee, and the trans-
action fee is rewarded to the miner who put the transaction
in a block accepted by the network. Thus, it is easy to see
that rational miners would like to maximize their own payoff
and pick the transaction with high fees into a block. In other
words, the higher the transaction fee is, the more miners try
to include it into the latest mined block. Thus, some low-fee
transactions may wait for days or months to be confirmed.
In addition, the high-fee transactions (also known as “whale”
transactions) may lead to many security issues. First, the whale
transactions can incentivize miners to join attacks, such as
a double-spending attack [23]. Second, combined with the
smart contract, these transactions can incentivize miners to
mine on the attackers desired chain branch [24]. Third, these
transactions can increase the instability of the whole system,
such as selfish mining [25]. Thus, we suggest a blockchain
system should limit the maximum value of the transaction fee.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the NC-based scaling protocols
and the incentive analysis of Bitcoin and Bitcoin-NG.
A. Scaling Protocols
There are two main approaches to redesign NC-based
blockchains to improve the transaction throughput and/or
reduce the transaction latency. The first is Bitcoin-NG and
its variants, which decouple the leader election with the
transaction serialization. The second is replacing the chain
structure with more generalized graphs, e.g., directed acyclic
graph (DAG) or parallel chain.
Bitcoin-NG and its variants. By decoupling leader election
with transaction serialization, Bitcoin-NG can successfully
approach the near-optimal throughput. Due to its simplicity
and significant prompt in throughput, this decoupling idea
has inspired a lot of blockchain protocols [8]–[10], [26]–[28].
Kokoris-Kogias et al. [8] proposed Byzcoin, which replaces
the single key-block owner with a committees to order trans-
actions and leverages the classical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) consensus to realize agreement between the committee
members. Furthermore, Pass and Shi [9] formally modeled
this family of blockchain protocols as hybrid consensus.
Later, Abraham et al. [10] proposed Solida, a decentralized
blockchain protocol based on reconfigurable Byzantine con-
sensus augmented by proof-of-work. It is easy to see that
NC can guarantee decentralization by electing the committee,
while the classical BFT consensus can provide an instant
finality and high efficiency. Some multi-chain designs [26]–
[28] make a forward step to extend one single consensus
committee to multiple committees.
Non-chain Style Block Structure. Due to the inherent lim-
itation (i.e., the throughput-security trade-off) of NC, many
protocols tries to replace the chain structure with directed
acyclic graph (DAG) (e.g., Ghost [29], Phantom [30], Spec-
tre [31], and Conflux [32]) or parallel chain (e.g., Prism [11],
OHIE [33], and Parallel Chain [34]). However, their reward
mechanism design and formal incentive analysis are less well
known in the literature partially due to their complicated
design.
B. Incentive Analysis
In this subsection, we introduce the prior works of incentive
analysis in Bitcoin and Bitcoin-NG.
Bitcoin Incentive Analysis. Eyal and Sirer [15] show that
the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive competitive. They
also introduce a deviant strategy named selfish mining, which
wastes honest power and decreases the security threshold to
0.25. Nayak et al. [16] conclude the selfish mining strategy
and extend it to the stubborn mining strategies, which also
combines an Eclipse attack. Moreover, Sapirshtein et al. [14]
and Gervais et al. [17] try to figure out the optimal Bitcoin
selfish mining threshold utilizing the MDP tool. Carlsten et
al. [25] focus more on the deviating strategy in the transaction-
fee regime where the block reward dwindles to a negligible
amount. Their undercutting attack works even an attacker only
accounts for small computation power and a poor network
connection. After confirming the postulate of Carlsten et
al. [25], Tsabary and Eyal [35] additionally study the Bitcoin
gap game between block reward and transaction fee.
Bitcoin-NG Incentive Analysis. As a variant of NC, Bitcoin-
NG also relies on incentive to provide security. Yin et al. [12]
extended the transaction fee distribution ratio after considering
another situation what the original paper omits [7]. Wang at
al. [13] considered advanced selfish mining strategies, i.e.,
stubborn mining strategies, when an attacker may manipulate
the micro-block chains between two honest parties. Wang at
al. [36] propose a Bitcoin-NG advance attack in their formal-
ized game-theoretical model. However, these prior works have
several limitations in the incentive analysis (see Sec I).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new incentive analysis
of Bitcoin-NG considering the network capacity. Our model
enables us to evaluate the impact of key-block generation in-
terval and microblock generation rate, which is missing in the
previous analysis. In particular, we have shown that Bitcoin-
NG can achieve even better incentive compatibility against the
microblock mining attack in our model. In addition, we have
modeled the selfish mining of key blocks and microblocks
jointly into an MDP and shown the threshold of Bitcoin-NG
is a little lower than in Bitcoin only when the selfish mining
power α is greater than 35%. We hope that our in-depth
incentive analysis for Bitcoin-NG can shed some light on the
mechanism design and incentive analysis of next-generation
blockchain protocols.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 4 (Chernoff bound for a sum of dependent random
variables [37]). Let T be a positive integer. Let X(j) =∑n−1
i=0 Xj+iT be the sum of n independent indicator random
variables and µj = E
(
X(j)
)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Let
X = X(1) + · · · + X(T ). Let µ = minj{µj}. Then, for
0 < δ < 1, Pr (X ≤ (1− δ)µT ) ≤ e−δ2µ/2.
Proof. Let X¯ = XT =
1
T
∑T
j=1X
(j). Then, for any t < 0, we
have
Pr (X ≤ (1− δ)µT ) = Pr (X¯ ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ E(etX¯)
et(1−δ)µ
.
(9)
Note that exp(·) is a convex function, we use Jensen’s inequal-
ity to obtain E(etX¯) ≤ 1T
∑T
j=1E
(
etX
(j)
)
. Hence,
Pr (X ≤ (1− δ)µT ) ≤ 1
T
T∑
j=1
E
(
etX
(j)
)
et(1−δ)µ
≤ 1
T
T∑
j=1
E
(
etX
(j)
)
et(1−δ)µj
,
(10)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that µj ≥ µ for
all j. Setting t = ln(1 − δ) < 0 and following the footsteps
in the proof of Theorem 4.5 in [38], we have
E
(
etX
(j)
)
et(1−δ)µj
≤
e−δ
2µj/2 for all j. Finally, we note that e−δ
2µj/2 ≤ e−δ2µ/2
for all j and this completes the proof.
Lemma 5 (Poisson tail [39]). Let X be a Poisson random
variable with rate µ (which is also its expectation). For 0 <
δ < 1, Pr(X > (1 + δ)µ) < e−Ω(δ
2µ) and Pr(X > (1 −
δ)µ) < e−Ω(δ
2µ).
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Proof. Recall that the moment generating function of a Pois-
son random variable is E[etX ] = e(e
t−1)µ. By Markov
Inequality, we have
Pr(X > (1 + δ)µ) = Pr(etX > et(1+δ)µ)
<
E[etX ]
et(1+δ)µ
=
e(e
t−1)µ
et(1+δ)µ
.
(11)
Setting t = ln(1 + δ), the right-hand side becomes
e[δ−(1+δ) ln(1+δ)]µ. It is not hard to show (using derivatives)
that (1 + δ) ln(1 + δ) ≥ δ + δ2/3, which completes the proof
of the upper tail bound. For the other side,
Pr(X < (1− δ)µ) = Pr(e−tX > e−t(1−δ)µ)
<
E[e−tX ]
e−t(1+δ)µ
=
e(e
−t−1)µ
e−t(1+δ)µ
.
(12)
Setting t = − ln(1 − δ), the right-hand side becomes
e[−δ+(1−δ) ln(1−δ)]µ. It is not hard to show that (1− δ) ln(1−
δ) ≥ −δ + δ2/2, which completes the proof.
13
